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The Conserved Quantity Theory 
of Causation and Chance Raising 
Phil Dowett 
University of Tasmania 
In this paper I offer an 'integrating account' of singular causation, where the term 
'integrating' refers to the following program for analysing causation. There are two 
intuitions about causation, both of which face serious counterexamples when used as 
the basis for an analysis of causation. The 'process' intuition, which says that causes 
and effects are linked by concrete processes, runs into trouble with cases of 'miscon- 
nections', where an event which serves to prevent another fails to do so on a particular 
occasion and yet the two events are linked by causal processes. The chance raising 
intuition, according to which causes raise the chance of their effects, easily accounts 
for misconnections but faces the problem of chance lowering causes, a problem easily 
accounted for by the process approach. The integrating program attempts to provide 
an analysis of singular causation by synthesising the two insights, so as to solve both 
problems. 
In this paper I show that extant versions of the integrating program due to Eells, 
Lewis, and Menzies fail to account for the chance-lowering counterexample. I offer a 
new diagnosis of the chance lowering case, and use that as a basis for an integrating 
account of causation which does solve both cases. In doing so, I accept various as- 
sumptions of the integrating program, in particular that there are no other problems 
with these two approaches. As an example of the process account, I focus on the recent 
CQ theory of Wesley Salmon (1997). 
1. The Conserved Quantity Theory and the Problem of Misconnections. 
The conserved quantity theory has been offered in a number of forms 
(see Dowe 1992, 1995, 1998; Salmon 1994, 1997; and Skyrms 1980). 
We will consider just the most recent version formulated by Wesley 
Salmon (1997), although the problem to be considered is a problem for 
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all the versions just mentioned. According to Salmon the following 
three definitions capture the essence of causality: 
Definition 1: A causal interaction is an intersection of world-lines 
that involves exchange of a conserved quantity, 
Definition 2: A causal process is the world-line of an object that 
transmits a non-zero amount of a conserved quantity at each mo- 
ment of its history (each spacetime point of its trajectory), 
Definition 3: A process transmits a conserved quantity between A 
and B (A$AB) if and only if it possess [a fixed amount of] this 
quantity at A and at B and at every stage of the process between 
A and B without any interactions in the open interval (A,B) that 
involve an exchange of that particular conserved quantity. (Salmon 
1997, ?6, 2) 
This theory has been refined over recent years in response to various 
criticisms and problems (see references listed above). However, if we 
wish to apply the theory to the question of how the events or facts that 
we call causes and effects are connected, clearly more work is needed. 
This is highlighted by the well known fact that the conserved quan- 
tity theory has problems with what I will call 'misconnections'; where 
two events or facts connected by causal processes nevertheless are ei- 
ther causally irrelevant to one another; or negatively relevant, i.e. where 
one tends to prevent the other. One example of the latter is Cartwright's 
(1983, Ch. 1) sprayed plant: a healthy plant is sprayed with a weedkiller 
which kills nine out of ten plants, but this particular plant survives. We 
can provide a set of causal processes and interactions (characterized 
by the transmission of conserved quantities) linking the spraying and 
the surviving, yet spraying does not cause the plant's survival. Papineau 
(1989, 1986) has given a similar case: being a fat child does not cause 
one to become a thin adult, although causal processes link the two. As 
in the sprayed plant case, two events which we would not call cause 
and effect are linked by a set of causal processes and interactions. 
In fact it can be shown that the failure of the conserved quantity 
theory at this point is more widespread and general than has been rec- 
ognized. These counterexamples are not esoteric quibbles but a com- 
monplace feature of causation. Consider a tennis ball bouncing off a 
brick wall, a paradigm case for the conserved quantity theory, since it 
involves clear cut cases of causal processes and their interaction. The 
passage of the ball through spacetime is a causal process by definitions 
2 and 3 since it possesses a conserved quantity (momentum) at each 
instant of its history. The collision between the ball and the wall is a 
causal interaction by definition 1, since the momentum of the ball 
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changes at the intersection of their worldlines. Yet, while its hitting the 
wall is the cause of its rebounding, nevertheless the collision with the 
tennis ball does not cause the wall to remain in the same place, nor 
does it cause the wall to be still standing. Nor does the collision cause 
the ball to still be green and furry. 
For any causal schema involving genuine causal processes and in- 
teractions there will be numerous events, facts, or states of affairs which 
are part of the schema. There is no guarantee that any two such events 
or facts will stand in a causal relation: in general they will not (the 
misconnections), although some will. Thus spraying the plant with 
weedkiller does not cause it to survive, nor to still have mostly green 
leaves, nor to still be in the corner of the yard; while spraying does 
cause it to be less healthy and to have some slightly yellowed leaves 
(let's say). 
Indeed, these considerations raise the suspicion that the conserved 
quantity theory fails to provide a sufficient condition for singular cau- 
sation relative to every actual schema of processes and interactions. If 
this is so then the conserved quantity theory is hardly an adequate 
account of the way causes and effects are connected. 
Can the conserved quantity theory be developed so as to overcome 
this difficulty? Well, it is clear that more needs to be said about the 
events or facts which are linked by causal processes and interactions, 
and how they are thereby linked. 
We shall suppose that the causal relata are either events or facts, 
both of which concern objects having properties at a time or a time 
period. Suppose an event is a change in a quantitative property of an 
object at a time; and a fact is an object having a quantitative property 
at a time or over a time period. Because both events and facts reduce 
to objects and quantities, this fits well with the conserved quantity the- 
ory. For simplicity, let's deal just with facts. Then, presumably, ac- 
cording to the conserved quantity account two facts are connected in 
a causal relation if and only if there is a continuous line of causal 
processes and interactions between the objects involved in those facts 
at those times. 
Furthermore, we will take it that such facts or events, if they enter 
into causation, must involve conserved quantities or supervene on facts 
and events involving conserved quantities. For example, the fact that 
the ball is green must supervene on the fact that various bits of the 
surface of the ball's fur have certain physical properties in virtue of 
which the ball looks green. If these properties are not conserved quan- 
tities, then they in turn must supervene on conserved quantities. This 
seems to be a natural development of the conserved quantity theory. 
Then we can write the relevant fact as q(a) = x, which reads 'object a 
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has x amount of conserved quantity q'. If a second type of conserved 
quantity is involved, we will write this as 'q". 
Then for the most general case of cause and effect we can write the 
cause as q(a) and the effect as q'(b), where a and b are objects and q 
and q' are conserved quantities possessed by those objects respectively, 
at the appropriate times. Then we can take it that: 
Definition 4: Fact q(a) and a fact q'(b) are related as cause and 
effect if and only if there is a thread of facts between q(a) and q'(b) 
such that: 
(1) at every point on the thread there is an object which possesses 
a conserved quantity, such that any change of object from a to b 
and any change of conserved quantity q to q' occur at a causal 
interaction involving the following changes: Aq(a), Aq(b), Aq'(a), 
and Aq'(a); and 
(2) for any exchange in (1) involving more than one conserved 
quantity, the changes in quantities are governed by a single law of 
nature. 
The purpose of (2) is to rule out cases where independent interactions 
occur by accident at the same time and place. 
For example, to take a simple case, the earlier momentum of a bil- 
liard ball (q(a) at tl) is responsible in the circumstances for the later 
momentum of the same ball (q(a) at t2). Then the cause-fact and the 
effect-fact are linked by a single thread involving just the object a and 
the quantity q, momentum. 
As a second example, shown in Figure 1, suppose the ball collides 
with another, so that the earlier momentum of the first ball (q(a) at tl) 
cause beffect 
q(a) at tl q(b) at t2 
a vvb 
{Aq(a), 6q(b)} a 
Figure 1. Collision between two balls, a, b. That the first had a certain momentum q(a) is 
the cause of the fact that the momentum of the second was q(b). 
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is causally responsible for the later momentum of the second ball (q(b) 
at t2). Then the cause and the effect are linked by the thread involving 
firstly q(a), the first ball having a certain momentum; then the inter- 
action Aq(a), Aq(b), the exchange of momentum in the collision, and 
then q(b), the second ball having a certain momentum. There is a 
change of object along this thread, but no change in the conserved 
quantity. 
As a third example, suppose (in a fictional physics) an unstable atom 
is bombarded by a photon of absorption frequency, which leads to the 
subsequent decay of the atom (Figure 2). Take q to be energy and q' 
to be charge. Then the cause q(a), that there is an incident photon with 
certain energy, is linked to the effect q'(c), that the second atom exists 
as the product of the decay. It is linked by a thread involving one 
interaction where there is an exchange of energy, and a different object, 
and a second interaction where one object becomes another, with an 
exchange of charge and of energy, which leads to the effect object hav- 
ing a certain charge, in virtue of which it is called the decay product. 
Further, there are laws governing how energy changes in a such a de- 
cay, involving the change in charge that it does. 
Suppose, to vary the example, that the atom happens not to decay. 
Then, by the present account, the incident photon is not the cause of 
the fact that the atom did not decay, since the effect concerns charge, 
not energy, and there is no interaction where both energy and charge 
are exchanged. 
We can now see how to deal with cases such as the tennis ball's 
momentum causes it to be green. This is ruled out because there is no 
appropriate thread involving an object and a conserved quantity. There 
is the continued existence of the ball and its momentum, but that does 
not belong to the same thread as the existence of green fur. 
This may also solve the sprayed plant case, if for example the cells 
affected by the poison simply die and the plant's continued life is the 
result of the development of other independent cells. 
However, while it solves many of these sorts of counterexamples, 
this account cannot completely solve the problem of misconnections. 
Suppose, to give a fairly abstract example, that some object has quantity 
q = 50, and that a critical value of q for the object is 45 (below which it 
decays or is dead or something). Suppose an interaction occurs which 
raises the value of q by 20, then a second interaction occurs which 
lowers the value of q by 40, leaving it with a q-value of 30, below the 
critical value. Define the following events (see Figure 3): 
f- q's value is raised by 20 at t1 
f2 q's value is lowered by 30 at t2 
This content downloaded from 130.102.158.18 on Thu, 19 Nov 2015 06:55:47 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
CONSERVED QUANTITY THEORY OF CAUSATION & CHANCE RAISING S491 
f- q's value is 40 at t3 
f- q's value is less than 45 at t3 
Now, we might be happy to say that fi caused f3, because without 
f1 the object would have had a lower value of q (although this would 
be debatable). But we would not, by any stretch of the imagination, 
say that f1 caused f4. For a start, without f1 f4 would have been much 
more likely. But the problem is, on the embellished conserved quantity 
account, f1 does cause f4 because it is the same object and the same 
quantity involved in both events, connected by a single causal thread. 
A concrete example of this would be where, in a cold place, the 
heater is turned on for an hour, bringing the room to a bearable tem- 
perature. But subsequently someone opens the window, and the tem- 
cause b (atom) effect 
q(a) at tl {Aq (b), Aq (c) q'(c) at t2 
Aq'(b), Aq'(c) } 
NE ' b (atom) 4?$ 
a 
(photon) {Aq (a), Aq (b) } (new atom) 
excess 
energy 
Figure 2. Incident photon a strikes atom b, raises its energy level, which then decays to 
atom c. 
fi ~~f f? addo 20 2 3 
\ 2 bsubtrat 30 f 
_ >, ~~~~~~4 
50 70 40 40 
ti t2 t3 
Figure 3. Misconnections. 
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perature drops to, say, 2? C. Then on the CQ account the fact that the 
heater was turned on is the cause of the fact that the temperature is 
unbearable at the later time. 
It seems to me that this captures the basic difficulty behind cases 
such as the sprayed plant and the fat child: two facts are linked by 
causal processes and interactions, yet one lowers the chance of the 
other. To bite the bullet here would be to accept the implication that 
f1 caused f4, and insist that whenever two facts are appropriately linked 
they are causally related. This may have the implication that there is 
no such thing as unsuccessfully inhibiting something, since a case like 
the sprayed plant is a case of causal connection. This certainly is coun- 
terintuitive, to say the least. 
Cartwright's and Papineau's examples were intended to show that 
an alternative tradition-namely the probabilistic or chance raising ac- 
count of causation-is able to account for these cases. We now turn to 
that theory. 
2. Chance Raising Theories and Chance Lowering Causes. The proba- 
bilistic or chance raising theory of causation takes causation to hold 
between two events only if the occurrence of one event, the cause, 
makes the probability of the other, the effect, much greater than it 
would otherwise be.' This condition is typically conjoined with others, 
for example, that the cause occur before the effect, and that there is no 
third event which "screens off' the relevant relation. We shall consider 
the probabilistic theory only in so far as it is a theory of singular cau- 
sation; that is, of the particular relation in virtue of which two partic- 
ular events or facts are cause and effect. 
It is usually held that the chance raising theory easily handles the 
problem of misconnections, and for the purposes of this paper we will 
grant that. Being sprayed by defoliant doesn't raise the probability of 
the plant surviving it lowers it; being a fat child doesn't raise the 
probability of being a thin adult, and turning on the heater doesn't 
raise the probability that the room would be an unbearable tempera- 
ture shortly after. The tennis ball hitting the wall doesn't raise the prob- 
ability of the wall staying standing in the same place, or of the ball 
being green and furry. 
1. In philosophy this sort of theory is usually traced to Suppes' influential book A 
Probabilistic Theory of Causality (1970), (see also Suppes 1984, Ch. 3), although both 
Reichenbach and Good had offered earlier versions. See Good 1961, 1962; Reichenbach 
1991. See also Cartwright 1983, Eells 1991, Glymour et al. 1982, Lewis 1986, Hum- 
phreys 1989, and Mellor 1995. 
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However, one persistent argument against the probabilistic or 
chance raising theory concerns counterexamples where a particular 
causal chain contains elements which lower the chance of their effect.2 
One example, given by Eells and Sober (1983), is the case where a golf 
ball is rolling towards the cup, but is kicked by a squirrel, and then 
after a series of unlikely collisions with nearby trees, ends up rolling 
into the cup. This is a case, it is argued, where a singular cause lowers 
the probability of its effect, in other words, a counterexample to the 
claim that the probabilistic theory provides a necessary condition for 
singular causation. 
There are a range of ways to handle cases like these.3 However, these 
methods cannot handle certain cases involving the kind of genuine sin- 
gle case objective chance found in quantum mechanics. Consider the 
following example (see Figure 4), which, according to our best physical 
theories, involves genuine indeterminism. 
An unstable atom Pb210 may decay by various paths as shown in 
Figure 4, which depicts the complete range of physical possibilities for 
this atom. Pb210 may decay to either P0210 or to T1206, in each case by a 
two step process. When Pb210 decays, the probability that it will pro- 
duce Hg206 is 1.8 X 10-8. The probability that Hg206 will produce T1206 
is one. When Bi210 decays, the probability that it will produce T1206 is
5.0 x 10-7 (from Enge 1966, 225, via Dowe 19934). We assume that 
each unstable atom has a very short half-life relative to the time frame 
under consideration. 
Pb - Bi-> Po 
Hg ------- TI 
Figure 4. Chance-lowering decay scheme. 
2. Such counterexamples are variations on an example due originally to Rosen (1978). 
3. Salmon (1984, Ch. 7) has outlined a number of methods used to solve this type of 
problem; see also Glymour et al. 1982. Another kind of strategy is the 'despite defence' 
suggested by Suppes (1984, 67) and defended by Papineau (1989, 1986), Eells (1988, 
130) and Mellor (1995, 67-68). I have addressed this in length elsewhere (Dowe 1996, 
1993) and will not consider it here. 
4. In turn a variant of a case presented by Salmon (1984, 200-201). See also Dowe et al. 
1996. 
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Let C be the decay to Bi; D the decay to Hg; E the production of TI; 
F the production of Po. Note that these events are not time-indexed. 
Then, 
P(E) = P(C)P(EIC) + P(D)P(EID) 
= [(1 - 1.8 x 10 - 8) x 5.0 x 10 - 7] 
+ (1.8 x 10 - 8 x 1) 
= 5.18 x 10-7 
and P(EIC) = 5.0 x 10-7 
Thus C lowers the probability of E. 
Take a particular instance (Figure 5) where the process moves: Pb210, 
Bi210, T1206, i.e., C occurs and leads to E. Then we should say that C 
causes E, yet it lowers its chance. 
Classic versions of chance raising theory, such as Suppes 1970, fail 
to account for this case. Suppes requires that P(EBC) > P(E) unless 
there is some other factor which screens off this dependence. In our 
case there isn't, since it is genuinely indeterministic (Dowe 1993, 
Salmon 1984). Other versions require that P(EB C) > P(E I - C), which 
also fails in our case since P(E I - C) = 1. 
One influential variation of the chance raising theory is the proba- 
bilistic dependence theory of David Lewis (1986, 175-178), which re- 
places the conditional probability relation with 'probabilistic depen- 
dence'-a counterfactual conditional about chance of the form 'if event 
C were to occur, the chance of event E would be much greater than if 
C were not to occur.' Lewis' theory has a number of advantages over 
the usual probabilistic theory; however it too fails to account for the 
decay case. For if C were not to occur (that is, if the decay Pb-+Bi were 
not to occur) then E would be more likely than if C did occur, because 
C's not occurring leaves a state of affairs such that Pb atom has not 
decayed, but will soon, ensuring that D occurs and subsequently, with 
probability 1, that E occurs. 
Pb S Bi - Po 
Hg-- > TI 
Figure 5. Chance lowering cause. 
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A recent version of the counterfactual approach is that of Mellor 
(1995), who takes the chance of an effect to be a fact about the cause 
in its circumstances, such that for C to cause E the chance that C gives 
E must be greater than the chance of E in the same circumstances but 
without C, 
chc(E) > ch-J(E). 
where the value of ch-c(E) is given by the closest world conditional 
-C =X ch(E) = p; and the chances are understood as single case ob- 
jective chance. However, this also fails in the decay case, since chc(E) 
= 5.0 x 10-7, while ch(E) at closest -C-worlds is about 1. 
However, the conserved quantity theory provides a ready answer to 
this kind of counterexample. Take the squirrel case, where a golf ball 
is travelling towards the hole, and a squirrel kicks the ball away, but 
(improbably) the ball hits a tree and goes in. There is a single thread 
of causal processes and interactions, all involving the ball, which can 
be traced from the squirrel's kick to the ball's landing in the hole. The 
kick is a genuine causal interaction, and so is the collision with the tree 
(both are changes in the momentum of the ball). The same may be said 
for the decay case. An atom is a genuine causal process and its decay 
is a genuine causal interaction involving, as it happens, not only pro- 
duction of the atom TI, but also either an alpha particle or a beta 
particle. Both C and E, in our particular case, involve a change in 
charge, a conserved quantity. Thus the conserved quantity theory ac- 
counts easily for these counterexamples. Not surprisingly, this has been 
one of the major arguments in its favor.5 
So we have two theories and two problems. The probabilistic theory 
cannot handle the chance lowering causes, but easily handles the mis- 
connections. The process theory easily handles the chance lowering 
cases, but cannot handle the cases of misconnection. This suggests an 
approach which incorporates both of these insights. In the next section 
we turn, therefore, to 'integrating' solutions. 
3. Integrating Solutions. Some philosophers have responded to this sit- 
uation by positing an approach which combines the process and the 
chance raising intuitions. I call such a synthesis an 'integrating solu- 
tion.' However, the two requirements we have considered cannot sim- 
ply be conjoined. Since the chance raising requirement is not a neces- 
sary condition for singular causation, the conjunction of the two is also 
not a necessary condition. 
5. For example, Dowe 1996, 1993; also Salmon 1984, Ch. 7. 
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Some authors (Sober (1985) was perhaps the first) have pointed to 
an asymmetry between the case of the squirrel (and the decay case) and 
the case of the sprayed plant. The asymmetry is that while both have 
the same probabilistic structure, with the particular events occurring 
contrary to the governing statistical relations, yet the squirrel's kick is 
a cause and the spraying of the plant is not. Some authors have used 
an explanation of this asymmetry as the basis for an account which 
brings together both the chance raising insight and the process insight. 
Authors who have attempted such a synthesis include Eells, Lewis, and 
Menzies. 
In Probabilistic Causality, Ellery Eells suggests (1991, Ch. 6; see also 
1988) that the difference between cases like the decay case and the 
sprayed plant is due to the different ways that the probability of an 
effect evolves between the occurrence of the two events. C causes E just 
if P(E) changes at the time of C, and is high just after C, higher in fact 
than it was just before C, and remains high until the time of E (see 
Eells 1988, 120). This gives the right result for cases like the sprayed 
plant, but it does not solve the decay counterexample. The particular 
instance where the decay process moves from Pb -+ Bi -+ Tl gives a 
trajectory for P(E) which drops at C and remains lower, yet we call C 
a cause of E. More specifically, the probability trajectory develops as 
follows: up until and immediately before C the probability of E is 5.18 
X 10-7, and from C until immediately before E the probability of E 
is 5.0 X 10-7 (see Dowe 1996, 230-231). 
A more promising approach is due to Lewis and Menzies. Lewis 
(1986, 175-184), defines a 'chain of probabilistic dependences' (in Men- 
zies' wording (1989, 650), as an ordered sequence of events such that 
each event probabilistically depends on the previous event. I (1996, 
232) call this a 'Lewis-chain'. Then C is a cause of E if and only if there 
is a Lewis-chain between C and E. 
According to Menzies (1989) there is an unbroken causal process 
between events C and E if and only if for any finite sequence of times 
between C and E, there is a corresponding sequence of events which 
constitutes a Lewis chain (of probabilistic dependences), and C is a 
cause of E if and only if there is a chain of unbroken causal processes 
between C and E. I (1996, 232) call this the 'Menzies-chain'. The effect 
of this is to allow one to cut the chain at convenient places. 
These accounts are able to handle the decay case as set out above. 
Take the event C', the existence of the Bi atom at a time between the 
occurrences of C and E. There is a relation of probabilistic dependence 
between C and C' because if C were not to occur then C' would not 
occur, except in the unlikely scenario that a Bi atom is produced by a 
process other than the decay of that Pb atom. Thus if C were not to 
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occur, C' would be very much less likely than if C were to occur. There 
is also a relation of probabilistic dependence between C' and E because 
if C' were not to occur then E would almost certainly not occur. (This 
follows from the Lewis approach to interpreting these counterfactuals: 
in supposing C' not to occur, we hold fixed the world up until the time 
of C', which means that C occurred (and so the decay to Hg will not), 
and that the atom Bi has disappeared; so there's virtually no chance 
that E will occur.) Thus there is a Lewis chain linking the cause and 
the effect, comprising of C-C'-E. There is also a Menzies chain. For 
any time ti between the times of C and E one can define the event Ci, 
the existence of the Bi atom at time ti, such that C-Ci-E forms a Menzies 
chain (see Dowe 1996, 232). 
However, these theories are not successful with a simple hypothetical 
variation on the decay case (see Dowe 1996, 232-233; Salmon 1984, 
Ch. 7) where we have a cascade, where the Bi atom immediately decays 
to TI (supposing that time is discrete, and that the decay of Bi to TI 
occurs at the very next instant following the decay of Pb to Bi). Then 
there is no time between the times of C and E, and so there is no event 
C', and since C and E do not stand in the relation of probabilistic 
dependence, there is no Lewis chain between the cause and the effect. 
And by similar reasoning, there is no Menzies chain between the cause 
and the effect. This counterexample brings out the fact that there is 
something ad hoc about this kind of solution. It shouldn't matter how 
dense the process is linking cause and effect. 
So these attempts to incorporate the idea of a process into a chance 
raising theory seem to fail to account for the decay case. However, I 
think that an alternative approach can succeed where these fail. This 
account turns on a new diagnosis of chance lowering causes. 
4. Diagnosis: Mixed Paths. The integrating account considered in the 
previous section all veered closer to the chance raising account than to 
the CQ theory. It is not surprising, therefore, that they handle the mis- 
connections case but not the chance lowering causes. This suggests that 
what we need is an integrating theory which takes the notion of a 
process more seriously. The first step in this account is to recognize the 
difference between causal paths and another kind of path. 
There can be more than one path between a cause and its effect. Some- 
times these paths are all causal processes: a gun fires a bullet which severs 
a rope, causing a large rock to land on a person's head just as the same 
bullet continues its path through that person's heart, a case of causal 
overdetermination. In other cases we have "mixed paths": the paths be- 
tween the cause and the effect are not all causal processes as defined by 
the CQ theory-some paths are paths of prevention. 
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I have argued elsewhere that 'causation' by omission and prevention 
(causing not to occur) (and other kinds of causation involving negative 
facts or the non-occurrence of events) are to be understood not as cases 
of genuine causation strictly speaking, but in terms of the mere possi- 
bility of genuine causation. For example, the father's grabbing the child 
prevented the accident is to be understood in terms of the possibility 
that an accident would have been caused by certain circumstances had 
the father failed to act. 
The chance lowering decay is an example of mixed paths. The cause, 
the production of Bi from Pb, caused its effect, the production of TI, 
via the causal process PB-Bi-Tl; and at the same time also prevented 
the reliable process Pb-Hg-Tl from producing E. In general, I claim, 
chance lowering causation arises where an event C initiates two paths, 
one of which has a chance of causing E, the other a chance of pre- 
venting E, and where the actual causal path is more reliable than the 
prevented causal path. Causes which initiate mixed paths act at the 
same time to cause and to prevent the effect. Of course they cannot 
successfully do both, although they could fail to do both. 
This formulation might seem a little awkward in the decay case since 
C does not strictly speaking initiate a process which might have pre- 
vented E. Rather, simply by occurring, it prevented the reliable process 
Pb-Hg-TI producing E. However, it is common practice in philosophy 
to speak of preventing A by bringing about something incompatible 
with A (e.g., Gasking 1955). 
Depending on the actual probabilities involved, there are two pos- 
sible problems with mixed paths. First, if P(E IC) < P(E) and path p is 
successful, then C causes E and we have a chance lowering cause. Sec- 
ond, if P(E IC) > P(E) and path a is successful, then C prevents E and 
we have a chance raising prevention. Chances lowering causes occur 
whenever the former obtains. 
5. The Solution.6 Had there been just the one path, p say, then it would 
have been the case that C caused E and raised its chance. Had there 
been just path a then it would have been the case that C prevented E 
and lowered its chance. The problems arise, we can now see, when an 
event C is both potentially a cause and potentially a preventer- mixed 
paths. 
6. In my own account of causation I do not accept this solution because, while I agree 
that chance-raising and causation may well be co-extentional, I think that chance needs 
to be explained in terms of causation and not the other way around. However, the 
purpose of this paper is to take for granted the tenets of the integrating approach, and 
to show how, granting those, a satisfactory integrating theory can work. 
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Figure 6. Decay case as involving "mixed paths". 
I think there is a way to combine the process and the chance raising 
insights so as to account for the mixed paths. To begin, consider Mel- 
lor's concept of the chance that C gives E in the circumstances, which 
he writes as "chc(E)". In cases of multi paths between a cause and its 
effect we can (although Mellor doesn't) think of that chance as having 
components. Just as the gravitational force on the moon has a com- 
ponent due to the earth and a component due to the sun, so the chance 
that C gives E has a component due to the possibility of process p and 
a component due to the possibility of process 6. 
In the decay case (Figure 5), C gives E a chance of 5.0 X 10-7, 
which has as components the chance 5.0 X 10-7 that E will be pro- 
duced via Bi decay, and the chance zero that E will be produced via 
Hg decay. We can write this as: 
chcp(E) = 5.0 x 10-7 
chc,(E) = 0 
where chcp(E) reads "the chance that C gives E in virtue of path p". 
My suggestion is, then, that for C to be the cause of E in virtue of 
process p, then it must be the case that 
(A) C would raise the chance of E were p the only path between C 
and E. 
Whether C raises the chance of E at that closest "p-only" world is 
itself a counterfactual matter, analysed as a closest world conditional 
(assuming here that we are following the counterfactual approach to 
chance raising). 
(A) is not a counterfactual that can be analysed in the usual manner 
of Lewis (1986), because process p begins, temporally, with C. What 
we need to do is compare the ch(E) at the closest worlds to ours where 
p is the only process involved between C and E, with the ch(E) at the 
closest worlds to that world where C does not occur. The ch(E) at the 
closest worlds to ours where r is the only process involved between C 
and E should be the component chcp(E) = 5.0 x 10-7, whereas the 
ch(E) at the closest worlds to that world where C does not occur is 
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ch-,,(E), which in our decay example is zero, since C is a necessary 
cause of E. Thus 
chc,(E) > ch-c,(E) 
so we say C is a cause of E in virtue of process p. 
Similarly, for C to be the preventer of E in virtue of process a, then 
C must lower the chance of E were a the only process involved between 
C and E. In our case chc,(E) is zero, while ch-c,(E) is one, since if C 
doesn't occur D occurs, which leads to E with probability 1. 
This approach may seem teleological, in that it analyses chances in 
terms of future possibilities, but I cannot see any other way forward. 
In some cases of mixed paths we could conditionalize on different parts 
of C, if, for example, the atom's having of one quantity is responsible 
for one process and its having another quantity is responsible for the 
other (in the manner of a well-known solution to some apparently 
chance lowering causes; see Salmon 1984, Ch. 7). But in general it may 
be the same quantity responsible for and involved in both processes. 
In our case, this is the case. Further, there is no way to conditionalize 
on unknown parts of C because we already have all the information 
there is, if the indeterministic interpretation of quantum mechanics is 
correct. 
Note also that in the decay case the p-only world is counterlegal, 
supposing that such decay schemes constitute laws of nature, although 
in other cases such as slicing a golf ball into the hole via a tree branch, 
the relevant p-only world is not counterlegal. 
So the integrating account of causation that I am proposing is as 
follows: 
C causes E iff 
(1) there is a causal thread between C and E, and 
(2) chcp(E) > ch-cp(E), where p is an actual causal process link- 
ing C with E. 
Causal threads are defined as in definition 4, above. 
To sum up, this account solves the problem of the sprayed plant by 
introducing to the conserved quantity theory a chance raising condi- 
tion. But it avoids the problems with chance lowering causes by distin- 
guishing components of objective single case chance, delineated ac- 
cording to relevant possible paths between the cause and the effect. 
These processes are themselves delineated by the original conserved 
quantity theory (definitions 1-3). 
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